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We examine the relationship between patent protection for pharmaceuticals and investment in development
of new drugs. Patent protection has increased around the world as a consequence of the TRIPS Agreement,
which specifies minimum levels of intellectual property protection for members of the World Trade
Organization. It is generally argued that patents are critical for pharmaceutical research efforts, and
so greater patent protection in developing and least-developed countries might result in greater effort
by pharmaceutical firms to develop drugs that are especially needed in those countries. Since patents
also have the potential to reduce access to treatments through higher prices, it is imperative to assess
whether the benefits of increased incentives have materialized in research on diseases that particularly
affect the poor. We find that patent protection is associated with increases in research and development
(R&D) effort when adopted in high income countries. However, the introduction of patents in developing
countries has not been followed by greater investment. Particularly for diseases that primarily affect
the poorest countries, our results suggest that alternative mechanisms for inducing R&D may be more
appropriate than patents.
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Toulouse School of Economics











I.  Introduction 
 
Intellectual property (IP) protection has expanded to most countries over recent decades, driven by 
the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Countries can attain membership in the WTO 
only by adopting minimum levels of copyright, trademark and patent protection as specified by the WTO’s 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, known as the TRIPS Agreement. In 
general, IP protection involves a tradeoff between dynamic efficiency (associated with incentives for 
innovation) and static efficiency (tied to access to innovation). The extension of patents on pharmaceuticals 
has been especially controversial for developing and least-developed countries, where access to treatments is 
already limited. We examine the effect of increased global IP rights on incentives for innovation, and in 
particular on the development of treatments for diseases that are most prevalent in relatively poor countries. 
The 1994 TRIPS Agreement requires WTO members to introduce and enforce IP protection. 
Developing countries have resisted granting patents on pharmaceuticals due to concerns about short run 
costs: because patents eliminate generic competition for treatments during their terms, patents potentially lead 
to higher prices and thus reduced patient access. However, if patents create incentives to develop drugs for 
conditions that are prevalent in developing countries, then patents may be tolerable in developing countries 
despite the static inefficiency.  
This paper tests for these dynamic benefits by examining research and development (R&D) in the 
form of clinical trial activity over time at the disease level. As patent protection is extended to countries with a 
population affected by a disease, then we should observe more R&D effort expended on that disease if patent 
protection is effective in inducing R&D. If, instead, patents are ineffective at inducing R&D on so-called 
“neglected” diseases, then no response in R&D effort would occur with the extension of patents to poor 
countries. Disease prevalence varies across countries, and countries complied with TRIPS at different times. 
We exploit cross-sectional variation over time in the adoption of TRIPS and the potential market size of 
diseases to estimate the relationship between R&D effort and patent protection, and to examine whether this 
relationship is uniform across diseases and countries. 
The results indicate that, in general, R&D effort is positively associated with the sizes of markets in 
which patent protection applies. However, the relationship between patent protection and R&D effort varies 
by country income level. There is a strong association between pharmaceutical patents and R&D effort for 
diseases that are prevalent in high income countries. Poorer countries can benefit from such R&D effort 
when they are affected by those same diseases, but the establishment of patent protection in poorer countries 
is not linked to greater R&D effort for diseases that have no market in developed countries. In other words, 
the introduction of patent protection has not been followed by an increase in R&D on diseases that primarily 
affect the world’s poor. Lanjouw & Cockburn (2001) concluded “[i]t is too early to tell…” the effect of TRIPS   3
on “new pills for poor people” (p. 287) in 2001. Using different measures and a longer period of observation, 
this study finds that TRIPS had yet to yield those pills as of 2006. 
The results suggest that the tradeoff between incentives for innovation (i.e., dynamic efficiency) and 
access to treatments (i.e., static efficiency) is quite different for rich countries than for the developing world. It 
is important to note that this paper examines only some potential gains from TRIPS for developing and least-
developed countries rather than attempting a comprehensive assessment of all benefits and costs of the 
policies. We find few gains for poorer countries, however. While important in developed countries, patents do 
not appear to increase innovation incentives elsewhere. Alternative mechanisms to induce innovation may be 
more appropriate, particularly for neglected diseases. 
In the next section, we discuss the TRIPS Agreement and its requirements in more detail. Section III 
outlines the theoretical underpinnings to our empirical approach, which we describe in Section IV. We explain 
our data sources and measures in Section V and present results in Section VI. Section VII concludes. 
 
II.  The TRIPS Agreement 
 
The WTO, including the TRIPS Agreement, was established in 1994 during the Uruguay Round of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Countries could not join the WTO without adopting TRIPS, 
which established minimum levels of copyright, trademark, industrial design, trade secret, and patent 
protection, and thus affected firms in a range of industries. The rationale was that all WTO members should 
offer similar intellectual-property protection to facilitate trade. By adopting and enforcing laws that protect 
intellectual property, member countries would cultivate and promote commerce. Intellectual property rights 
would integrate developing and least-developed countries into the global economy by reducing the risks to 
established multinational corporations of operating in these economies, as well as by enabling technology 
transfer and by enhancing incentives to sell goods with proprietary intellectual content in these markets.  
TRIPS specifies minimum levels of intellectual property protection and enforcement as well as 
dispute resolution procedures when a member state is accused of failing to comply with the agreement. The 
minimum term of patent protection is now 20 years, and member states must grant patents for both products 
and processes in most areas of technology, including pharmaceuticals. Penalties for infringement must be 
sufficient to deter violations. The WTO dispute resolution procedures may result in sanctions against a 
member state in violation of the agreement. 
According to the WTO, TRIPS “attempts to strike a balance between the long term social objective 
of providing incentives for future inventions and creation, and the short term objective of allowing people to 
use existing inventions and creations….Intellectual property protection encourages inventors and creators 
because they can expect to earn some future benefits from their creativity. This encourages new inventions,   4
such as new drugs, whose development costs can sometimes be extremely high, so private rights also bring 
social benefits” (WTO Fact Sheet 2006).  
Since discussions over TRIPS began, the Agreement has been controversial. The major controversy is 
over whether the right balance was struck, particularly in the case of patent protection for pharmaceuticals. 
Proponents of the TRIPS policy noted that the prospect of higher profitability resulting from IP protection 
would induce additional research on neglected diseases, or those that primarily affect poorer countries. Others 
noted that patents could allow firms to increase prices and reduce access to treatments and pointed in 
particular to the case of HIV treatments (Westerhaus and Castro 2006, Cohen 2006, Outterson 2009).1 The 
original agreement included a number of exceptions for poorer countries, and TRIPS has been revised several 
times in response to concerns about the effects of patents in developing and least-developed countries. In 
addition to formal revisions, the interpretation of TRIPS, compliance and enforcement have changed over 
time and affected how TRIPS is implemented in practice (Correa 2001).2 
Because compliance with TRIPS constituted a major change in IP rights in many countries, TRIPS 
provides specific deadlines for compliance that vary according to the income level or development status of a 
member state. According to the WTO: 
 
“When the WTO agreements took effect on 1 January 1995, developed countries were given one year 
to ensure that their laws and practices conform with the TRIPS agreement. Developing countries and 
(under certain conditions) transition economies were given five years, until 2000. Least-developed 
countries have 11 years, until 2006 — now extended to 2016 for pharmaceutical patents. 
 
“If a developing country did not provide product patent protection in a particular area of technology 
when the TRIPS Agreement came into force (1 January 1995), it had up to 10 years to introduce the 
protection. But for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products, the country had to accept the 
filing of patent applications from the beginning of the transitional period, though the patent did not 
need to be granted until the end of this period. If the government allowed the relevant pharmaceutical 
or agricultural chemical to be marketed during the transition period, it had to — subject to certain 
conditions — provide an exclusive marketing right for the product for five years, or until a product 
patent was granted, whichever was shorter.” 
   (http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm) 
 
                                                 
1 Many other papers discuss aspects of this controversy. Among many others, these include Cohen and Illingworth 
(2003), Kohler (2007), Li (2008), Taubman (2008), Chaudhuri et al (2006) and Lanjouw (2003). 
2 For example, Brazil now requires issuance of a compulsory license prior to parallel importing (Oliveira et al (2004)).   5
The WTO uses the United Nations’ definition of least-developed countries for the purpose of establishing 
compliance deadlines. All other WTO members identified themselves as either developing or developed upon 
applying for WTO membership. New members joining after 1995 were generally required to implement 
TRIPS immediately as part of their ascension agreements with the WTO, and could not use a transition 
period. Appendix B provides a list of WTO members and their compliance dates. Figure 1 shows how TRIPS 
compliance changed over time across countries with different income levels (as defined by the World Bank 
for 1995). 
In addition to different deadlines for countries of lower income levels, TRIPS included other 
exemptions that had the effect of weakening patent protection for pharmaceutical products in some 
situations. The “Bolar provision” allows a patented invention to be used in the process of conducting research 
on new drugs as well as in obtaining marketing approval for generic drugs prior to patent expiration. This 
provision has been invoked in the United States, Canada, Europe, India, and recently, China, as well as in 
other countries. Another exemption, granted under the Doha Declaration in 2002, allows countries that meet 
certain criteria to issue a compulsory license as long as the licensed products are manufactured for domestic 
use only (i.e., not for export), and with “reasonable” compensation to the patent holder.3 Interpreting the 
Doha policy has proven challenging, however, because TRIPS and subsequent revisions specify neither what 
constitutes a national health emergency nor how a reasonable payment should be calculated. Compulsory 
licenses have so far been rare and mainly issued on drugs for treating HIV (in Thailand, Brazil, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, South Africa, Zambia and Mozambique among others) despite the health costs associated with the 
HIV epidemic in other countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Nonetheless, the threat of compulsory licenses may 
be an important influence on pharmaceutical distribution in these countries. Where compulsory licenses have 
been issued, they too have been controversial, particularly in the case of Brazil and Thailand. For example, in 
response to Thailand’s decision to issue a compulsory license on a hypertension drug as well as an HIV 
treatment, Abbott Laboratories (whose patent on the HIV treatment Kaletra was at issue) announced that it 
would no longer supply Thailand with any products. The US Trade Representative then put Thailand on its 
Priority Watch List and the WHO cautioned Thailand to improve its relationship with pharmaceutical firms. 
The discussion over compulsory licenses highlighted that such orders may have little effect on national health 
in less wealthy countries when complementary institutions such as clinics and pharmacies for administering 
pharmaceuticals are absent. Furthermore, the compulsion to issue a license is meaningless in the absence of 
local manufacturers to which the license could be assigned (Westerhaus and Castro 2006). This last concern 
was addressed in 2003, when the WTO agreed on exceptions to rules that restricted trade in compulsory 
licensed products. After 2003, member states that declared a national health emergency and ordered a 
                                                 
3 See “Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,” available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm   6
compulsory license could import those products from generic manufacturers located elsewhere if they lacked 
domestic manufacturing capacity.  
 
III.  Theoretical development 
 
We assume that pharmaceutical firms seek to maximize profits, and form expectations about the 
profit that may be eventually obtained if the R&D leads to a successfully commercialized product when they 
make R&D investments. We focus on three factors that influence expected profits: intellectual property 
protection, the size of potential markets, and wealth in potential markets. IP protection and wealth are related 
to the price a firm expects to charge, and potential market size is related to the quantity a firm expects to sell. 
 
The role of patent protection 
The development of new pharmaceuticals is an expensive and lengthy process. DiMasi et al. (2004) 
estimated that developing a new drug during the 1990s cost about $400-500 million, and the time required 
from project inception to the commercial introduction of a new drug is 4-10 years. Though there is debate 
over the proper way to account for the required investment (DiMasi et al. 2005), there is no dispute that the 
fixed costs of drug development are very large relative to the marginal costs of production, and that there is a 
high failure rate of development projects. In contrast, the cost of imitating a pharmaceutical innovation tends 
to be relatively small (Grabowski 2002). IP protection, particularly in the form of patents, provides a means 
for innovators to earn a return on their investments in R&D by granting a legal monopoly that normally 
allows firms to charge higher prices than possible when facing competition. 
While not the only mechanism for inducing innovation, patents are considered of particular 
importance in the pharmaceutical sector relative to other industries (Cohen et al 2000) because of the high 
fixed cost of drug development. As pharmaceutical researchers allocate resources between research projects, 
they consider the tradeoffs associated with the potential for return in the global market. It is challenging to 
isolate the effect of a single country’s change in patent protection on R&D investments because decisions to 
invest in R&D on a particular condition are usually influenced by global conditions.  As a result, direct tests of 
the link between patent protection and R&D investment in pharmaceuticals are rare. Sakakibara and 
Branstetter (2001) found little change in R&D attributable to a change in Japanese patent law in 1988. Qian 
(2007) studied pharmaceutical patent changes in a cross-section of (mostly developed) countries between 1978 
and 2002 and concluded that domestic R&D did not increase due to a strengthening of patent protection 
alone. Rather, the effect of patent protection was moderated by a country’s level of economic development. 
However, Lichtenberg and Waldfogel (2003) found that the 1983 Orphan Drug Act in the United States, 
which increased the period of patent protection for drugs to treat rare conditions, stimulated the development   7
of drugs for such diseases. We complement these studies by offering additional evidence on the response in 
global pharmaceutical R&D to the extension of patent protection to a large set of countries under TRIPS. 
 
The role of market size 
  Economic theory predicts that profit-maximizing firms seek to amortize fixed costs over the sale of 
many units. Given the fixed R&D costs of developing a new drug, larger potential markets will tend to be 
more attractive, all else equal. There is ample empirical evidence of the relationship between market size and 
drug development. Ward and Dranove (1995) associated a 10 percent increase in demand for care in a 
therapeutic area with a 5-8 percent increase in R&D spending. The Lichtenberg and Waldfogel (2003) paper 
mentioned previously linked market size to R&D investment; indeed, this link – and the absence of 
investment in treatments for rare conditions – was the basis for the Orphan Drug Act in the US. Finkelstein 
(2004) examined the response of pharmaceutical firms to the implementation of US federal policies that 
required childhood vaccination against six diseases. This paper found that research firms responded to the 
dramatic increase in expected demand by doubling the number of drugs in clinical trials. Acemoglu and Linn 
(2004) studied the relationship between market size and drug launches in the US, finding an increase of 1% in 
market size leads to a 4% increase in the number of new drugs introduced. Thus, the projected size of the 
market is an important factor in decisions to invest in pharmaceutical R&D. 
 
The role of income 
Economic theory predicts that the profit-maximizing markup (Lerner index) of a price-discriminating 
monopolist is the inverse of the demand elasticity in a market. Typically, the greater the percentage of income 
required to purchase a good, the more elastic the demand. Consumers of pharmaceuticals in developed 
countries are likely to have lower demand elasticity than those in poorer countries in part because of their 
higher incomes and in part because patients in poorer countries may pay out-of-pocket instead of through 
insurance. Given that the marginal costs of drug production may not vary extensively by country, the 
difference in elasticity implies that, all else equal, pharmaceutical firms distributing patent-protected therapies 
should charge higher prices per patient in developed countries than in developing countries. With such 
pricing, the share of a pharmaceutical firm’s profits from developed countries may be much higher than from 
developing countries, even before accounting for differences in the number of patients eligible for treatment. 
This is consistent with the fact that members of the trade association PhRMA derive more than 80% of their 
revenues from sales in the US, Canada, Europe and Japan. 
For diseases that affect patients in countries of all income levels, the higher mark-ups that are optimal 
in developed countries may enable firms to recoup R&D investments, and thus allow firms to sell in the rest   8
of the world at prices greater than only marginal costs.4 Extending patent protection to more countries can 
increase expected profits. The higher the income level of the country adopting stronger patents, the greater 
the increase in expected profit and thus the greater the incentive to invest in R&D.5 
In the case of treatments for diseases that afflict relatively few patients in developed countries, namely 
the “neglected” diseases, a firm must recoup its R&D investment solely through sales to developing and least-
developed countries. In many countries, the best viable price may be close to (or even below) marginal cost, 
even for a firm with patent protection and monopoly pricing power; if so, then firms cannot recoup their 
R&D investments. As noted in other work (e.g., Kremer 2002, Danzon and Towse 2003), patent protection 
may therefore not be sufficient to induce R&D investment in the case of treatments with a limited market in 
developed countries. For this reason, Kremer has proposed the use of alternative incentive mechanisms such 
as advance market commitments (AMCs). 
To summarize, we expect R&D investments in pharmaceuticals to depend on the strength of patent 
protection, the expected size of the total potential market for a treatment, and the income level in the 
countries for which the drug is intended. TRIPS had the effect of changing the strength of patent protection 
in countries with different disease patterns and with different income levels. R&D investment should increase 
with the degree of patent protection for diseases whose market is global, and more so for relatively wealthy 
countries. However, patent protection may not affect incentives for R&D investment in diseases with markets 
in only poor countries where patients cannot afford to pay a significant markup over marginal cost. In the 
following section, we specify an empirical test for these hypotheses. 
 
IV.  Empirical methods 
 
Our empirical strategy is to examine R&D efforts at the disease level, exploiting changes in both 
patent protection and disease patterns that varied over time and across countries. We are particularly 
interested in the effect of patent protection on R&D efforts for neglected diseases and its interaction with the 
income level of countries that strengthen their patent laws. We start with a basic model relating R&D effort 
and potential market size, and subsequently decompose potential market size by disease type, patent 
protection and income levels. Descriptions of our measures of each are in the next section. 
The unit of analysis throughout is a disease-year. We begin by estimating the relationship between 
yearly R&D investment in a disease area and the total potential market size of the disease. That is, 
                                                 
4 In practice, there is mixed evidence that pharmaceutical firms charge substantially lower prices in developing countries 
(see Maskus (2001)). There are many possible explanations for this, which this paper does not address. However, 
differences in prices are an important element of the TRIPS debate because of concerns that high prices in developing 
countries are the result of patent protection. 
5 Other policies may, of course, also play a role. The use of price controls may constrain pricing and reduce expected 
profits, even for high-income countries. Stringent regulatory requirements for launching a drug may contribute to 
country-specific fixed costs.   9
   Ydt =α0 +α1Mdt +ΑXdt +εdt         ( 1 )  
where Ydt is a measure of R&D effort in disease d in year t, Mdt is a measure of potential market size disease d 
in year t, and X is a vector of controls, such as measures of the availability of substitute products and year 
fixed effects. We expect a positive coefficient on Mdt, i.e. that α1 > 0. 
  Next, we decompose potential market size by disease type to explore whether R&D effort responded 
differently to global diseases than to neglected diseases (precise definitions of global and neglected diseases are 
provided in the following subsection). We estimate the following equation: 
   Y dt =β 0 +β 1Mdt *Global+β2Mdt *Neglected +ΒXdt +εdt   (2) 
where Global = 1 if disease d is a global disease, Neglected = 1 if disease d is a neglected disease and other 
variables are defined as above. While global diseases clearly have a higher level of R&D effort, β1 and β2 
reflect the change in R&D associated with a change in potential market size. Subsequent specifications 
investigate the source of the difference between β1 and β2, if any. 
  One such source may be that neglected diseases primarily affect countries that historically lacked 
patent protection. If this is the main driver of the difference in R&D effort, then we should observe no 
difference between R&D effort for neglected and global diseases with patent-protected markets. In addition, 
R&D effort for neglected diseases should increase more for expanded patent-protected markets than for 
markets without IP. The TRIPS policy “experiment” allows us to examine this by estimating: 
  
Y dt = γ0 +γ1Mdt *Global*IPt +γ2Mdt *Global*NoIP t
+γ3Mdt *Neglected*IPt +γ 4Mdt *Neglected*NoIP t +ΒXdt +ε dt
  (3) 
Mdt*Global*IPt is the total potential market size of disease d in year t across all countries with IP, where 
disease d is a global disease; Mdt*Global*NoIPt is the total potential market size of a global disease d in year t 
across all countries without IP; and so on. The difference between γ3 and γ4 reflects how effective TRIPS has 
been at inducing R&D for neglected diseases. 
  Patent protection may not induce R&D on either global or neglected diseases in less wealthy 
countries if the ability of patients to pay is extremely low. Our final specification evaluates the impact of 
patent protection across both disease types and the level of income of countries affected by a particular 
disease:   10
  
Y dt =η 0 +η 1Mdt *Global*IPt *High+η2Mdt *Global*NoIP t *High
+η3Mdt *Global*IPt *UpperMiddle+η4Mdt *Global*NoIP t *UpperMiddle
+η5Mdt *Global*IPt *LowerMiddle+η6Mdt *Global*NoIP t *LowerMiddle
+η7Mdt *Global*IPt *Low+η8Mdt *Global*NoIP t *Low
+η9Mdt *Neglected*IPt *High+η 10Mdt *Neglected*NoIP t *High
+η11Mdt *Neglected*IPt *UpperMiddle+η 12Mdt *Neglected*NoIP t *UpperMiddle
+η13Mdt *Neglected*IPt *LowerMiddle+η 14Mdt *Neglected*NoIP t *LowerMiddle
+η15Mdt *Neglected*IPt *Low+η 16Mdt *Neglected*NoIP t *Low
+ΝXdt +ε dt
(4) 
Mdt*Global*IPt*High is the total potential market size of global disease d in year t across high income 
countries with IP. Mdt*Global*NoIPt*High is the total potential market size of global disease d in year t across 
high income countries without IP. Similarly, Mdt*Neglected*IPt*UpperMiddle is the total potential market size 
of neglected disease d in year t across upper middle income countries with IP, etc. We expect that patent 
protection has a smaller effect on profits in poorer countries than in rich countries and therefore a smaller 
effect on R&D incentives, so that η1 > η3 > η5 > η7 and η9 > η11 > η13 > η15. A market for a global disease 
may exist in relatively rich countries, and thus there may be a positive effect of patent protection in poorer 
countries on profits and R&D effort on global diseases, implying that η5 > η6 and η7 > η9. For neglected 
diseases, however, we expect η13 = η14 = 0 and η15 = η16 = 0: patent protection in countries where patients 
have very low ability to pay does not affect profits or induce R&D effort. 
A concern is that patent protection is an endogenous policy choice. Historically, countries have 
adopted IP protection in response to demands from domestic innovators, or after achieving a rather high level 
of development (Qian 2007). We argue that in the case of TRIPS, developing and least-developed countries 
were clearly resistant to adopting or strengthening IP protection and did so only because they expected large 
benefits of membership in the WTO. Another recent paper examining the TRIPS agreement concluded “the 
Agreement's implementation is an external factor, not entirely influenced by the country's level of economic 
development…[Changes in IP due to TRIPS] can be used as a natural experiment to understand how IPR 
influences economic activities and behaviors” (Hamdan-Livramento 2009). However, if resistant countries 
also adopted policies aimed at undermining patent protection or pricing power (such as widespread use of 
compulsory licensing or stringent price controls) or failed to enforce patent laws, our results may understate 
the effect of IP protection on R&D efforts. We interpret our results in light of this possibility. 
 
V.  Data and measures 
 
  The analysis depends on information about R&D efforts over time and by disease, measures of 
potential market size (assessed as disease prevalence) over time and across countries, and country-level factors   11
such as IP law and income level. Sources and the construction of variables are described below. Table 1 
provides summary statistics. Our final dataset spans 17 years (1990-2006). 
 
R&D effort 
  Our measure of R&D effort is the number of new clinical trials initiated by the industry in a year for a 
specific disease. These trials constitute the majority of R&D expenditures in the industry. Ideally, our measure 
of R&D effort would be research expenditures by disease and by year. Unfortunately, publicly traded firms 
generally do not report R&D spending by disease and, furthermore, many pharmaceutical firms are not 
publicly traded and do not disclose any financial information about their spending on R&D. Despite the 
limitations, we believe that the information we employ about the number of clinical trials is among the most 
comprehensive available on early-stage R&D projects by disease and by year. Our source is the R&D Focus 
database managed by IMS. Typically used by pharmaceutical firms to monitor the research activities of 
competitors, R&D Focus provides a history of all projects known to be in development from the mid-1980s 
through the present. This includes projects that failed in clinical trials, those that were successfully launched, 
and those that continue in development. Each record is a pharmaceutical project and may be associated with 
multiple indications and multiple firms. The history of the project’s progression through each stage of 
development is compiled by IMS from patent and regulatory filings, presentations at medical conferences, 
press releases, and information disclosed to financial analysts.  
To capture early R&D efforts, we focus on the first stage of human clinical testing, i.e. Phase I trials.6 
Because our dependent variable Ydt is a count of new Phase I trials in disease d in year t, we estimate 
regressions as negative binomials. We trim the dependent variable to 75 (less than 1% of our observations 
have a value above this). The information in the IMS database also allows us to construct a count of existing 
treatments for each disease in 1990, which we use as a control for competition. 
 
Disease prevalence and type 
  We proxy for “potential market size,” or disease-level demand, using the number of people dying 
from a disease by country and year. The WHO publishes the number of deaths attributed to a disease as 
recorded by national civil registration systems on an annual basis. A better measure would account for how a 
disease affects quality of life. One such measure is the disability-adjusted life year (DALY), though this has 
been controversial because it incorporates subjective judgments about disease severity.7 DALYs are available 
from the WHO for only a single cross-section, so using this measure would ignore changes over time in 
                                                 
6 We have also performed the same analysis on later stages of clinical development and obtained similar results. 
7 Earlier versions of this paper used this single cross-section of DALYs to measure market size. While results presented 
here are largely consistent with our previous findings, we decided the advantages of the time variation provided in the 
mortality data outweighed those of DALYs.   12
disease prevalence or severity. In our regressions, we define potential market size as the log of the sum of all 
deaths from disease d across all countries (or subset of countries, depending on the specification) in year t. 
  We faced two main challenges in using the WHO Mortality Data. First, the coverage of the dataset is 
not comprehensive. For example, all data might be missing for a particular country in a particular year or even 
in several years; coverage of China is not complete, and there is no information on some least-developed 
countries such as Afghanistan, Malawi and Madagascar. To the extent possible, we used multiple imputation 
techniques to deal with the missing values and correct standard errors. However, we are likely to 
underestimate deaths in the poorest countries. Countries may also use different practices in coding deaths. 
Another challenge involved matching disease definitions from the WHO with those in the R&D Focus 
database. The WHO uses the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) codes, while R&D Focus 
provides indications and therapeutic classifications for each drug development project. For each indication in 
the R&D Focus database, we identified a likely ICD code using medical dictionaries. The most detailed ICD 
codes in the WHO Mortality Data were not available for a sufficient number of countries or years and were 
often too specific to match to R&D Focus indications. We use instead a condensed list of 84 categories of 
diseases or conditions that covers everything in the WHO mortality data except “external causes” that are not 
typically addressed with pharmaceutical therapies, such as car accidents, falls, and intentional self-harm. These 
diseases are listed in Appendix A.8 
We categorize a disease as “neglected” using Table 1 of Moran et al. (2009). Moran et al. (2009) used 
a three-step filter to identify neglected diseases: first, the disease must disproportionately affect developing 
countries; second, new treatments are needed; and finally, no commercial market is thought to exist. These 
conditions are also those for which more than 90% of diagnosed deaths occur in developing or least-
developed countries over the period of our study, and include HIV, tuberculosis, malaria, river blindness and 
leprosy. Even developed countries experience some incidence of some neglected diseases, but at much lower 
rates than poorer countries. The list of neglected diseases generated by this categorization includes all the 
neglected tropical diseases identified by the WHO as well as those considered by Lanjouw and Cockburn 
(2001).  
Global diseases affect countries of all income levels, and include cardiovascular conditions, 
neurological disorders, and cancer. Questions arise about whether HIV is a global or neglected disease. Moran 
et al. (2009) and the WHO consider HIV a neglected disease, although HIV affects large numbers of people in 
developed countries as well. While many treatments for HIV now exist, not all are well-suited for use in 
developing countries or, in particular, for children (who constitute a much larger fraction of HIV patients 
                                                 
8 The WHO relies on reports of cause of death from each country. Countries report cause of death using either ICD9 or 
ICD10 codes during our sample period. However, the WHO cautions that due to differences in reporting across 
countries, it may not be appropriate to make inter-country comparisons. The WHO also provides data that has been 
corrected for use in such comparisons (the Global Burden of Disease data), but this is available for a single cross section 
only. Our results are robust to using this data.   13
outside developed countries than in developed countries). HIV qualifies as a “neglected” disease if there are 
insufficient incentives to develop appropriate treatments for developing countries, which now report a greater 
need for 3rd and 4th line therapies. In our main analysis, we consider HIV as a neglected disease, but in 
robustness checks, we run analyses that first classify HIV as a global disease and then drop HIV from the 
data. Overall, our results are robust to the alternative classification of HIV as a global disease. 
 
IP measures and other country information 
  The WTO established a timetable for compliance with TRIPS. We use these rules, described in 
Section II, to estimate the dates of compliance for every country. Original WTO members that self-identified 
as “developed” are considered compliant in 1995. For self-identified developing countries that were WTO 
members in 1995, we code the year of compliance as 2000. WTO member countries identified as “least-
developed” according to the United Nations were required to comply by January 1, 2005, with the deadline 
extended until January 1, 2006 and even further during the Doha round to 2016. Thus, for least-developed 
countries, we assume that compliance will occur only in 2016. For all other countries that joined after 1995, 
we code compliance as the date of membership unless we found different information about the compliance 
date on the WTO website.9 
Measuring TRIPS compliance using the WTO rules has several drawbacks. First among them is that, 
while a country may claim to comply with TRIPS, its enforcement of patent and other IP protections may be 
in doubt. We check for robustness using two alternative measures of patent protection and enforcement. 
Walter Park kindly shared his updated index of IP protection and enforcement compliance, which he has used 
in a number of published analyses (see, e.g., Ginarte and Park 1997). This measure is more nuanced than our 
TRIPS dummy variable, but it is not available for 40 countries in our dataset and is available only at 5 year 
intervals. The Ginarte-Park index has separate elements for chemical patents and for enforcement; we use 
both the existence of chemical patents and strong enforcement to create a dummy variable indicating whether 
a country has chemical/pharmaceutical patent protection and enforces patent laws.10 For developed countries 
that joined the WTO in 1995 and for which the Ginarte-Park index indicated the presence and enforcement 
of pharmaceutical patents in 1990, we adjusted our TRIPS dummy variable to indicate compliance as of 1990. 
This avoids characterizing the membership of the United States in the WTO as requiring a major shift in IP 
law. Recent work by Hamdan-Livramento (2009) investigates in much greater detail the state of patent law 
and enforcement in 53 developing countries, and the author generously shared his index of TRIPS compliance 
with us. This analysis was especially relevant because the investigated developing countries encompassed the 
majority for which IP laws changed after TRIPS. We use the components of the index related to 
                                                 
9 The WTO lists a few countries that joined after 1995 with transition periods that expired in 1999. See 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/tripfq_e.htm 
10 The results are robust to the use of other elements of the Ginarte-Park index.   14
pharmaceutical patents and enforcement, where available. For countries not covered by the Hamdan-
Livramento index, we use our initial measure of TRIPS compliance.  
There are a number of differences across these three measures of IP laws and enforcement. Appendix 
B contains the list of countries used in our analysis, the year of compliance required by the WTO, the first 
year of both pharmaceutical patents and enforcement according to the Ginarte-Park index and the first year of 
both pharmaceutical patents and enforcement according to the Hamdan-Livramento index.11 A limitation on 
all the measures of IP compliance is that they do not capture expectations that firms may have about the state 
of future patent protection in a country. Since drug development is a lengthy process, firms may make 
investment decisions based on whether they believe a country will afford intellectual property protection some 
years in the future, providing a measure of time for the R&D to yield a commercialized product. In other 
words, an influential factor in decisions about R&D may be a country’s intention to adopt patent protection as 
a condition of WTO membership rather than the precise timing of compliance. Even in these situations, the 
compliance date is likely to be critical both because of the resolution of uncertainty about intentions to 
implement IP mechanisms and because, after the date of compliance, firms have remedy for IP violations via 
the WTO dispute resolution process.  
Another important factor influencing R&D decisions for which we cannot account relates to the 
forecasted possibility of compulsory licensing. Firms may be reluctant to invest in R&D for diseases that are 
likely to be the subject of compulsory licensing. While few such licenses were issued during our sample period 
(which ends in 2006), our failure to account for these expectations would lead us to underestimate the impact 
of “true” patent protection. However, even if these expectations had shaped R&D decisions, our models 
would accurately reflect the overall effect of TRIPS given its various exemptions. 
We use the World Bank’s World Development Indicators dataset for information on country income 
levels. The World Bank categorizes countries as high income, upper middle income, lower middle income and 
low income. We report the 1995 income level for each country listed in Appendix B. Because the unit of 
analysis is the disease-year rather than the country, we are limited in our ability to control for many additional 
geographic factors that might influence pricing and volumes. Among the omitted variables that concern us are 
the location of potential patients within each country and the presence or absence of complementary 
institutions such as hospitals, clinics and pharmacies. Unfortunately, even the country information is 
incomplete for large numbers of countries, and especially for developing and least-developed countries. 
Because we are interested in these countries, we use a very parsimonious set of controls.  
                                                 
11 We researched the history of disputes for each WTO member and explored other sources of data on IP laws and 
enforcement such as the US Trade Representative’s Watch List and Priority Watch List. We did not incorporate the ad 
hoc information we obtained about compliance and enforcement because the Watch List is available only after 2000 and 
the set of countries included is skewed towards those engaged in significant trade with the US (Canada and Italy, for 
example, appear on the Watch List in some years).    15
The models include a series of year dummy variables to account for broad changes in the health 
environment over time. Note that not all low income countries are least-developed countries as defined by the 
United Nations, and therefore some introduced patent protection during our sample period (see Appendix B). 
 
VI.  Results 
 
Our baseline results from estimating equations 1-4 are presented in Table 2, with robustness checks 
in Tables 3-5 and a summary of the robustness checks in Table 6. The dependent variable in all specifications 
is the number of drug development projects for disease d entering Phase I clinical trials in year t. The 
regressions are estimated as negative binomials (Poisson models were rejected due to overdispersion). All 
specifications include year fixed effects and a control for the number of treatments available for disease d in 
1990. Standard errors, which are in parentheses below the coefficients, are clustered by disease and corrected 
for use of multiple imputation to deal with missing values for disease data.  
For our baseline specifications, we define IPt using WTO rules for TRIPS compliance and categorize 
HIV as a neglected disease. Column 1 corresponds to equation 1, column 2 to equation 2, and so on. As 
expected, R&D effort is positively associated with overall potential market size (α1 = 0.057 with a standard 
error of 0.002). If we separate diseases into global and neglected, the coefficients on both measures of 
potential market size are also positive and statistically significant (0.034 and 0.028, respectively). R&D effort in 
the aggregate and for both global and neglected diseases is positively related to increases in the number of 
potential patients. However, the coefficients on global and neglected disease market sizes are statistically 
different from each other. 
Our main focus is the source of the difference between the R&D response to global and neglected 
diseases. One possibility, which we cannot test directly, is that drug development is more expensive for 
neglected diseases than for global diseases, which might mean that the potential market size for a neglected 
disease would have to be greater than for a global disease to induce an equivalent amount of R&D effort. 
Another possible explanation is that neglected diseases primarily affect countries that have had weak patent 
systems historically, which may lead investing organizations to hesitate in committing R&D out of concern 
than patents will not be enforced. We address this in column 3, which decomposes market size not only by 
disease type but also by prevalence in countries with or without TRIPS-compliant  patent systems. The 
difference between γ1 and γ2 reflects the relationship between the adoption of IP and R&D efforts for global 
diseases, and the difference between γ3 and γ4 does likewise for neglected diseases. For both types of diseases, 
there is a strong positive association between TRIPS compliance and R&D effort, with R&D more responsive 
to IP-protected market size for global diseases than for neglected diseases. Thus, we find that IP protection is 
associated with increased R&D effort for both types of diseases, but there remains a statistically significant   16
difference between the response to IP-protected market size for global diseases and IP-protected neglected 
diseases. 
In Section III, we noted that patent protection may not lead to greater expected profits in countries 
where most patients are unable to pay even the marginal cost of treatment. Our final specification, which 
estimates equation 4, separates potential market size by disease type, existence of patent protection and the 
income level of those afflicted. By separating countries by income level, the analysis allows for differences in 
the relationships between TRIPS compliance and R&D effort based on projections of ability to pay. As 
expected, we find the greatest increment to R&D effort associated with increases in potential market size in 
high income countries with patent protection. This relationship holds for both global and neglected diseases: 
the coefficients η1 and η9 are 0.353 and 0.342, respectively, and both are statistically significant. In high 
income countries – where ability to pay is less likely to be blunted by poverty and the absence of 
complementary services such as clinics, personnel, etc., -- the adoption of patent protection seems to induce 
research on diseases that are prevalent in the population. The relationship does not hold for less wealthy 
countries, regardless of patent protection. In other words, R&D effort is not associated with the 
implementation of TRIPS in lower income countries. None of the coefficients on potential market size 
outside of the high income category are positive or significantly greater than zero. These results suggest that 
while patent protection is effective at inducing R&D for diseases prevalent in high income countries, it is not 
sufficient for diseases that have no market outside the developing world. The difference between R&D effort 
directed at global diseases and neglected diseases is driven mainly by the difference in income of those 
affected, rather than a difference in patent protection alone. 
We re-ran our analysis to check the robustness of our results across different definitions and 
measures. A summary of the tests of coefficients in equation 4 across these many specifications is presented in 
Table 6. Tables 3, 4, and 5 report the details of the regressions. In Table 3, we report on regressions that allow 
for a lag in the response of R&D to the extension of patent protection. We conduct this test because our 
baseline model assumes that firms can respond immediately to the introduction of patent protection by 
initiating Phase I trials. If preclinical research is required, the Phase I response may be delayed by several 
years. Table 3 contains the results of specifications identical to those in Table 2, except that market size is 
lagged by three years to allow for preclinical testing.12 The results are similar to those in the main model. 
Although we observe a statistically significant coefficient on IP-protected market size for global diseases in 
middle income countries, the coefficients for neglected disease market size remain insignificant.  
Table 4 estimates equation 4 using alternative definitions of IPt. Column 1 is our baseline 
specification, using WTO rules for TRIPS compliance. Column 2 uses the Ginarte-Park definition, and 
Column 3 uses the Hamdan-Livramento definition. While some of the parameter estimates differ across 
                                                 
12 We experimented with different lags and found similar results.   17
specifications (which is expected, since we noted variation across these measures in Section V), the overall 
pattern remains. No coefficient on market size is significantly greater than zero outside of the high income 
category, though the difference between IP and no IP is positive for the lower middle income group.  
We examine the sensitivity of results to the classification of HIV in Table 5. The first column again 
contains our baseline results in which HIV is classified as a neglected disease. Column 2 classifies HIV as 
global, and Column 3 excludes HIV from the analysis. Once again, we find the same pattern of coefficients 
across income types with one important difference. While the coefficients η1 and η2 (market size for the high 
income category for global and neglected diseases) are quite similar when HIV is defined as neglected, there is 
a wide gap between them in columns 2 and 3. This result arises from the fact that HIV is the most prevalent 
“neglected disease” in rich countries, which means that and significant R&D, both public and private, has 
been invested to address it. Unfortunately, available measures of R&D effort are not sufficiently nuanced to 
capture differences across projects in dosage formulations or combinations best suited to developing or least-
developed countries (such as pediatric and heat-stable presentations), and thus we cannot test formally for 
differences in R&D investments for HIV targeted at higher and lower income countries. 
Although we have reported many robustness checks in this paper, it is important to qualify our 
findings in several ways. One concern is the potential endogeneity of IP protection and enforcement. It may 
be that countries only adopt and enforce patent laws when they have achieved a minimum level of income and 
development. In practice, developing and least-developed countries have often attempted to delay and weaken 
the requirements of TRIPS, and ultimately implemented the policy to achieve other benefits from WTO 
membership. We find only weak evidence that IP rights have an impact in developing and least-developed 
countries, but this may reflect an unwillingness to enforce these rights and understate the real effect of strong, 
enforceable patents. 
More generally, expectations about future policies related to profitability and IP rights, which are not 
observed, are important to incentives. Price controls are an example of a policy (widespread in developed 
countries) that could dampen profits even in the presence of patents. The use of compulsory licensing is 
another, and this is not restricted to developing and least-developed countries. For example, the Canadian 
government once extensively issued compulsory licenses (although prior to TRIPS). Even in the US, in 2001 
the government considered compulsory licenses for Cipro, a treatment for anthrax, and in 2005 on Tamiflu, a 
treatment for avian influenza.13 If governments are expected to issue compulsory licenses for some drugs, 
R&D investment choices may reflect these expectations. As noted previously, few compulsory licenses were 
issued during our sample period. However, the option of compulsory licenses is an important aspect of how 
TRIPS compliance affects R&D incentives, and the use of price regulation is not addressed by TRIPS at all. 
                                                 
13 “Pressure Rises on Producer of a Flu Drug,” New York Times, October 11, 2005.   18
Thus, while we may underestimate the impact of “true” patent protection, our results should still accurately 
reflect the impact of TRIPS in particular.  
Another concern is that our data source may not reflect all research activities. For example, IMS may 
focus on the activities of firms more intensively than on the activities of universities, foundations, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) in assembling its R&D Focus data. If this bias in coverage exists, we 
would underestimate the number of projects underway. If universities and other nonprofits are more likely to 
focus on neglected diseases and are sensitive to the IP environment, then we might be biased towards finding 
less effort on such diseases. However, this is unlikely to be a major problem for several reasons. First, we 
compared the IMS R&D Focus coverage to two competing databases from PJB Publications and Thomson 
Scientific. The coverage of IMS included firms located in a larger set of countries than the other two. Second, 
about 17% of the organizations covered by IMS R&D Focus are universities, foundations, or other non-profit 
organizations. Third, the controversy over TRIPS and increased attention to the burden of disease in the 
developing world – through the Gates Foundation or the Clinton Health Initiative, for example – may have 
made all types of organizations more likely to “advertise” and disclose their R&D activities directed at 
neglected diseases, which may cause an upward bias in our estimate of the impact of patent protection. It 
should be noted that increased funding from these NGOs and others may also have stimulated additional 
R&D for neglected diseases, but this should be unrelated to the presence of patent protection (many NGOs 
oppose patent protection, in fact). 
The WHO Mortality Data is a compilation of information provided by each member country, which 
may vary in quality. In particular, the prevalence of HIV appears to be understated in many developing and 
least-developed countries.14 Omitting HIV from our sample does not change the qualitative results, however. 
In addition, an earlier version of this paper yielded similar findings based on the WHO’s Global Burden of 
Disease dataset. Ultimately, we used the WHO Mortality Data because it includes time-series variation as well 
as more specific disease categories. Our results using the Global Burden of Disease dataset are consistent with 
those presented here from the Mortality Data. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
This paper examines how R&D investment in pharmaceuticals has changed with the adoption of the 
TRIPS Agreement. Particularly in the case of patents for pharmaceutical treatments, TRIPS involves a 
tradeoff between dynamic efficiency, i.e. incentives for R&D investment, and static inefficiency, i.e. access to 
drugs. An important issue for developing and least-developed countries is whether the introduction of patent 
protection for drugs has led to an increase in R&D effort to treat diseases that are especially prevalent there. 
                                                 
14 An AIDS-related death may be coded as a death from pneumonia, for example.   19
We conclude that patent protection in developing and least-developed countries does not appear to 
have created incentives for investment in new treatments for diseases that primarily affect poorer countries. 
R&D on neglected diseases is not associated with increases in the potential market size in low-income 
countries, whether or not those markets provided patent protection. This is not to claim that patents are 
irrelevant: patent protection is associated with greater R&D investment in diseases that affect high income 
countries, and the treatments developed as a result may benefit people in poorer countries too. The existence 
of a market in rich countries allows firms to recover their R&D investments. Consequently, global diseases – 
those present in countries of all income levels – attract research effort. However, patent protection is not 
sufficient to induce R&D for diseases that have no significant potential market in high-income countries. If 
those affected, or their governments, lack the ability to pay prices much higher than the marginal cost of 
producing treatments, firms are unable to recoup the fixed costs of R&D regardless of the level of patent 
protection. 
Our study focuses on only one possible effect of the introduction of IP rights. Importantly, we do 
not tackle the issue of whether access to treatments in developing countries decreased, or how investments in 
health-delivery systems in developing countries may have changed in response to TRIPS implementation. 
Other possible effects include an increase in technology transfer to developing countries and greater 
incentives for domestic R&D activity. WTO membership, possible only with the adoption of TRIPS, may 
have provided other benefits to developing countries that we do not consider here.  
The results of this research suggest that alternative mechanisms for inducing R&D effort on 
neglected diseases may be more effective than the extension of patent protection alone. Recently, such 
mechanisms have received increased attention from policy makers and other organizations. For example, the 
first advance market commitment for a pneumococcal vaccine was established in 2007 by GAVI. The US 
introduced a system of priority review vouchers targeted at neglected diseases in 2007. In 2008, UNITAID 
proposed the use of a patent pool for pediatric HIV treatments. We hope that such efforts will soon yield new 
treatments for diseases that principally affect patients in less wealthy countries. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
Number of countries  192            
Number of diseases  84            
Number of years  17            
    N  Mean StdDev Min  Max 
Phase I starts (all)  1428 8.086 17.704 0  229 
Phase I starts (trimmed)  1428 7.386 12.479 0  75 
Ln(Total Ln(Deaths) (1000s))  1428 10.296 2.486 3.022  14.910 
Ln(Deaths)*global disease  1428 9.141 3.810 2.079  14.910 
Ln(Deaths)*neglected disease  1428 3.224 2.821 2.079  13.162 
Ln(Deaths)*IP*global disease  1428 8.539 4.043 1.386  14.910 
Ln(Deaths)*IP*neglected disease  1428 2.444 2.746 1.386  13.030 
Ln(Deaths)*no IP*global disease  1428 6.389 3.941 1.386  14.358 
Ln(Deaths)*no IP*neglected disease  1428 2.246 2.430 1.386  12.647 
Ln(Deaths)*high income*IP*global  1428 7.716 4.464 0.000  13.980 
Ln(Deaths)*high income*IP*neglected  1428 1.072 2.835 0.000  12.354 
Ln(Deaths)*high income*no IP*global  1428 3.135 3.759 0.000  11.297 
Ln(Deaths)*high income*no IP*neglected  1428 0.427 1.606 0.000  9.741 
Ln(Deaths)*upper middle income*IP*global  1428 5.417 4.021 0.000  12.476 
Ln(Deaths)*upper middle income*IP*neglected  1428 0.735 2.207 0.000  11.242 
Ln(Deaths)*upper middle income*no IP*global  1428 4.074 4.485 0.000  12.284 
Ln(Deaths)*upper middle income*no IP*neglected 1428 0.701 2.338 0.000  11.241 
Ln(Deaths)*lower middle income*IP*global  1428 5.190 4.781 0.000  14.183 
Ln(Deaths)*lower middle income*IP*neglected  1428 0.808 2.535 0.000  12.029 
Ln(Deaths)*lower middle income*no IP*global  1428 5.061 4.396 0.000  14.055 
Ln(Deaths)*lower middle income*no IP*neglected 1428 0.850 2.542 0.000  12.039 
Ln(Deaths)*low income*IP*global  1428 3.669 3.754 0.000  12.523 
Ln(Deaths)*low income*IP*neglected  1428 0.580 1.941 0.000  10.418 
Ln(Deaths)*low income*no IP*global  1428 4.652 3.561 0.000  12.473 
Ln(Deaths)*low income*no IP*neglected  1428 0.767 2.240 0.000  10.886 
 
The unit of observation is a disease-year. Summary statistics are calculated for HIV defined as a neglected 
disease and IP protection as TRIPS compliant. Multiple imputation methods were used to complete missing 
observations on deaths.   23
Table 2: Negative binomial regressions of Y = number of new Phase I trials in disease-year 
 Variable  Eq. 1  Eq. 2  Eq. 3  Eq. 4 
Ln(Total Deaths)  0.035**      
(0.003)      
Ln(Deaths)*global disease     0.034**      
 (0.003)     
Ln(Deaths)*neglected disease     0.029**      
 (0.004)     
Ln(Deaths)*IP*global disease        0.068**    
   (0.006)   
Ln(Deaths)*IP*neglected disease        0.057**    
   (0.008)   
Ln(Deaths)*no IP*global disease        -0.007     
   (0.007)   
Ln(Deaths)*no IP*neglected disease        -0.005     
   (0.009)   
Ln(Deaths)*high income*IP*global           0.357**
     (0.030) 
Ln(Deaths)*high income*IP*neglected           0.294**
     (0.049) 
Ln(Deaths)*high income*no IP*global           0.086* 
     (0.048) 
Ln(Deaths)*high income*no IP*neglected           -0.168**
     (0.076) 
Ln(Deaths)*upper middle income*IP*global           -0.050**
     (0.020) 
Ln(Deaths)*upper middle income*IP*neglected           0.074  
     (0.171) 
Ln(Deaths)*upper middle income*no IP*global           -0.111**
     (0.049) 
Ln(Deaths)*upper middle income*no IP*neglected           0.007  
     (0.089) 
Ln(Deaths)*lower middle income*IP*global           0.026  
     (0.045) 
Ln(Deaths)*lower middle income*IP*neglected           -0.000  
     (0.218) 
Ln(Deaths)*lower middle income*no IP*global           -0.046  
     (0.043) 
Ln(Deaths)*lower middle income*no IP*neglected           0.190* 
     (0.101) 
Ln(Deaths)*low income*IP*global           -0.048  
     (0.034) 
Ln(Deaths)*low income*IP*neglected           -0.083    24
     (0.129) 
Ln(Deaths)*low income*no IP*global           -0.031  
     (0.025) 
Ln(Deaths)*low income*no IP*neglected           -0.230**
     (0.056) 
Treatments in 1990  0.056** 0.056** 0.058**  0.051**
(0.002) (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Intercept  -1.57** -1.50**  -0.601**  -2.20** 
(0.217) (0.220)  (0.259)  (0.316) 
Number of Observations Used   1428 1428 1428 1428 
Log  likelihood  19218.1 19220.1 19241.5 19387.4 
 
* = significant at 5%, ** = significant at 1%. Standard errors are clustered by disease and adjusted for use of 
multiple imputation. Year fixed effects are included in all specifications.  25
Table 3: Robustness to lagged measures of market size 
 Variable  Eq. 1  Eq. 2  Eq. 3  Eq. 4 
Ln(Total Deaths)  0.057**      
(0.002)      
Ln(Deaths)*global disease     0.034**       
 (0.002)     
Ln(Deaths)*neglected disease     0.028**       
 (0.004)     
Ln(Deaths)*IP*global disease        0.065**    
   (0.006)   
Ln(Deaths)*IP*neglected disease        0.055**    
   (0.009)   
Ln(Deaths)*no IP*global disease        0.003     
   (0.006)   
Ln(Deaths)*no IP*neglected disease        0.002     
   (0.009)   
Ln(Deaths)*high income*IP*global           0.353** 
    (0.033) 
Ln(Deaths)*high income*IP*neglected           0.342** 
    (0.060) 
Ln(Deaths)*high income*no IP*global           0.145** 
    (0.043) 
Ln(Deaths)*high income*no IP*neglected           -0.142* 
    (0.073) 
Ln(Deaths)*upper middle income*IP*global           -0.019  
    (0.016) 
Ln(Deaths)*upper middle income*IP*neglected           -0.042  
    (0.176) 
Ln(Deaths)*upper middle income*no IP*global           -0.162** 
    (0.045) 
Ln(Deaths)*upper middle income*no IP*neglected           -0.207** 
    (0.087) 
Ln(Deaths)*lower middle income*IP*global           0.024  
    (0.045) 
Ln(Deaths)*lower middle income*IP*neglected           0.088  
    (0.206) 
Ln(Deaths)*lower middle income*no IP*global           -0.078  
    (0.047) 
Ln(Deaths)*lower middle income*no IP*neglected           0.411** 
    (0.105) 
Ln(Deaths)*low income*IP*global           -0.037  
    (0.042) 
Ln(Deaths)*low income*IP*neglected           -0.113    26
    (0.119) 
Ln(Deaths)*low income*no IP*global           -0.028  
    (0.023) 
Ln(Deaths)*low income*no IP*neglected           -0.349** 
    (0.058) 
Treatments in 1990  0.035** 0.057** 0.059** 0.049** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Intercept  -1.58** -1.52** -0.936**  -2.01** 
(0.213) (0.216) (0.246) (0.291) 
Number of Observations Used   1428 1428 1428 1428 
Log  likelihood  19222.9 19225.3 19237.8 19400.6 
 
* = significant at 5%, ** = significant at 1%. Standard errors are clustered by disease and adjusted for use of 
multiple imputation. Year fixed effects are included in all specifications. 
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Table 4: Robustness to IP definition 
Variable TRIPS  Hamdan Ginarte-
Park 
Ln(Deaths)*high income*IP*global  0.357** 0.481** 0.418**   
(0.030)   (0.051)   (0.033)  
Ln(Deaths)*high income*IP*neglected  0.294**  0.224   0.223**  
(0.049)   (0.183)   (0.051)  
Ln(Deaths)*high income*no IP*global  0.086* 0.145**  0.027   
(0.048)   (0.061)   (0.031)  
Ln(Deaths)*high income*no IP*neglected  -0.168**  -0.101   -0.047  
(0.076)   (0.185)   (0.060)  
Ln(Deaths)*upper middle income*IP*global  -0.050** -0.051** -0.058**   
(0.020)   (0.019)   (0.021)  
Ln(Deaths)*upper middle income*IP*neglected  0.074   -0.016   0.049  
(0.171)   (0.084)   (0.139)  
Ln(Deaths)*upper middle income*no IP*global  -0.111**  0.039   -0.038  
(0.049)   (0.052)   (0.040)  
Ln(Deaths)*upper middle income*no IP*neglected  0.007   -0.086   -0.023  
(0.089)   (0.088)   (0.055)  
Ln(Deaths)*lower middle income*IP*global  0.026   -0.009   0.015  
(0.045)   (0.033)   (0.058)  
Ln(Deaths)*lower middle income*IP*neglected  -0.000   0.009   0.103  
(0.218)   (0.089)   (0.175)  
Ln(Deaths)*lower middle income*no IP*global  -0.046   -0.468**  -0.140**  
(0.043)   (0.056)   (0.039)  
Ln(Deaths)*lower middle income*no IP*neglected  0.190* 0.291* 0.160* 
(0.101)   (0.143)   (0.079)  
Ln(Deaths)*low income*IP*global  -0.048   0.009   0.002  
(0.034)   (0.022)   (0.036)  
Ln(Deaths)*low income*IP*neglected  -0.083   -0.063   -0.215**  
(0.129)   (0.051)   (0.075)  
Ln(Deaths)*low income*no IP*global  -0.031   0.026   -0.029  
(0.025)   (0.028)   (0.024)  
Ln(Deaths)*low income*no IP*neglected  -0.230** -0.270** -0.165* 
(0.056)   (0.072)   (0.077)  
Treatments in 1990  0.051** 0.050** 0.052**   
(0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)  
Intercept  -2.20**   -1.62**   -2.11**  
(0.316)   (0.291)   (0.302)  
Number of Observations Used   1428 1428 1428 
Log likelihood  19387.4   19430.1   19394.9  
 
* = significant at 5%, ** = significant at 1%. Standard errors are clustered by disease and adjusted for use of 
multiple imputation. Year fixed effects are included in all specifications.   28
Table 5: Robustness to HIV classification 
 Variable  Neglected Global  Omitted 
Ln(Deaths)*high income*IP*global  0.357**   0.397**   0.380** 
(0.030)   (0.030)   (0.030) 
Ln(Deaths)*high income*IP*neglected  0.294**   0.215**   0.218** 
(0.049)   (0.072)   (0.071) 
Ln(Deaths)*high income*no IP*global  0.086*  0.035   0.069  
(0.048)   (0.043)   (0.048) 
Ln(Deaths)*high income*no IP*neglected  -0.168**   -0.272**   -0.267** 
(0.076)   (0.095)   (0.095) 
Ln(Deaths)*upper middle income*IP*global  -0.050**   -0.056**   -0.052** 
(0.020)   (0.020)   (0.020) 
Ln(Deaths)*upper middle income*IP*neglected  0.074   0.087   0.086  
(0.171)   (0.178)   (0.176) 
Ln(Deaths)*upper middle income*no IP*global  -0.111**   -0.051   -0.103** 
(0.049)   (0.045)   (0.050) 
Ln(Deaths)*upper middle income*no IP*neglected  0.007   0.035   0.028  
(0.089)   (0.091)   (0.091) 
Ln(Deaths)*lower middle income*IP*global  0.026   0.012   0.012  
(0.045)   (0.044)   (0.045) 
Ln(Deaths)*lower middle income*IP*neglected  -0.000   0.090   0.090  
(0.218)   (0.260)   (0.257) 
Ln(Deaths)*lower middle income*no IP*global  -0.046   -0.048   -0.042  
(0.043)   (0.042)   (0.043) 
Ln(Deaths)*lower middle income*no IP*neglected  0.190*  0.145   0.135  
(0.101)   (0.115)   (0.116) 
Ln(Deaths)*low income*IP*global  -0.048   -0.057*  -0.050  
(0.034)   (0.031)   (0.034) 
Ln(Deaths)*low income*IP*neglected  -0.083   -0.209   -0.211  
(0.129)   (0.204)   (0.203) 
Ln(Deaths)*low income*no IP*global  -0.031   -0.050**   -0.027  
(0.025)   (0.023)   (0.025) 
Ln(Deaths)*low income*no IP*neglected  -0.230**   -0.022   -0.020  
(0.056)   (0.089)   (0.089) 
Treatments in 1990  0.051**   0.051**   0.051** 
(0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002) 
Intercept  -2.20**   -2.55**   -2.44** 
(0.316)   (0.323)   (0.330) 
Number of Observations Used   1428 1428 1411 
Log likelihood  19387.4   19392.0   18970.2 
 
* = significant at 5%, ** = significant at 1%. Standard errors are clustered by disease and adjusted for use of 










IP vs no IP, high income, neglected 0.47**  0.52**  0.21  0.33** 0.43** 0.43** 
IP vs. no IP, high income, global  0.26** 0.21** 0.30** 0.42** 0.32** 0.29** 
Global vs. neglected, high income, IP  0.04    -0.00   0.28*   0.18**  0.19**  0.18** 
Global vs. neglected, high income, no IP  0.25**  0.30**  0.20 0.09 0.30**  0.31** 
IP vs no IP, upper middle income, neglected  0.05   0.13   0.02  0.05  0.06  0.07  
IP vs. no IP, upper middle income, global  0.09   0.16**   -0.11*    -0.05  0.04  0.07  
Global vs. neglected, upper middle income, IP   -0.11   0.03    -0.01   -0.09   -0.13   -0.12  
Global vs. neglected, upper middle income, no IP   -0.14   0.00   0.12  0.01   -0.11   -0.13  
IP vs no IP, lower middle income, neglected   -0.16    -0.25    -0.16   -0.07   -0.05   -0.04  
IP vs. no IP, lower middle income, global  0.06    0.13** 0.55** 0.19** 0.04  0.04   
Global vs. neglected, lower middle income, IP  0.08    -0.00    -0.01   -0.01  0.01  0.01  
Global vs. neglected, lower middle income, no IP   -0.14    -0.39**   -0.73**   -0.29**   -0.09   -0.08  
IP vs no IP, low income, neglected  0.15   0.24   0.23**   -0.00   -0.16   -0.17  
IP vs. no IP, low income, global  0.01   0.01   0.00  0.04  0.02  0.00  
Global vs. neglected, low income, IP   -0.03    -0.00   0.00  0.11  0.04  0.04  
Global vs. neglected, low income, no IP  0.10   0.22**  0.24**  0.06   -0.14   -0.13  
 
* = significant at 5%, ** = significant at 1%. Wald tests of coefficients corresponding to Equation 4 for various specifications.Appendix A: Disease list; * indicates a neglected disease category 








Diarrhoea and gastroenteritis of 
presumed infectious origin 
A09
Other intestinal infectious 
diseases (includes typhoid)* 
A01-A08
Respiratory tuberculosis* A15-A16




Whooping cough  A37
Meningococcal infection A39
Septicaemia  A40-A41
Infections with a predominantly 
sexual mode of transmission 
A50-A64
Acute poliomyelitis  A80
Rabies  A82
Yellow fever  A95
Other arthropod-borne viral 




Viral hepatitis  B15-B19







Remainder of certain infectious 
and parasitic diseases (includes 
leprosy, trachoma and Buruli 
ulcer)* 
A21-A32, A38, A42-A49, A65-A79, A81, A83-
A89, B00-B04, B06-B09, B25-B49, B58-B64, 
B66-B94, B99 
Neoplasms  Malignant neoplasm of lip, oral 
cavity and pharynx 
C00-C14
Malignant neoplasm of 
oesophagus 
C15
Malignant neoplasm of stomach C16
Malignant neoplasm of colon, 
rectum and anus 
C18-C21
Malignant neoplasm of liver and 
intrahepatic bile ducts 
C22
Malignant neoplasm of pancreas C25
Malignant neoplasm of larynx C32
Malignant neoplasm of trachea, 
bronchus and lung 
C33-C34
Malignant melanoma of skin C43
Malignant neoplasm of breast C50  31
Malignant neoplasm of cervix 
uteri 
C53
Malignant neoplasm of other 
and unspecified parts of uterus 
C54-C55
Malignant neoplasm of ovary C56
Malignant neoplasm of prostate C61
Malignant neoplasm of bladder C67
Malignant neoplasm of 
meninges, brain and other parts 
of central nervous system 
C70-C72
Non-Hodgkin's lymphoma C82-C85
Multiple myeloma and 




Remainder of malignant 
neoplasms 
C17, C23-C24, C26-C31, C37-C41, C44-C49, 
C51-C52, C57-C60, C62-C66,C68-C69,C73-
C81,C88,C96-C97 
Remainder of neoplasms  D00-D48








Anaemias  D50-D64 
Remainder of diseases of the 
blood and blood-forming 
organs and certain disorders 







Diabetes mellitus  E10-E14
Malnutrition E40-E46
Remainder of endocrine, 
nutritional and metabolic 
diseases 
E00-E07, E15-E34, E50-E88
Mental and behavioural 
disorders 
F01-F99
Mental and behavioural 
disorders due to psychoactive 
substance use 
F10-F19
Remainder of mental and 
behavioural disorders 
F20-F99
Diseases of the 
nervous system 
Meningitis* G00,  G03
Alzheimer's disease  G30
Remainder of diseases of the 
nervous system 
G04-G25, G31-G98
Diseases of the eye and adnexa H00-H57
Diseases of the ear and mastoid 
process 
H60-H93
Diseases of the 
circulatory 
system 
   
Acute rheumatic fever and 




Ischaemic heart diseases I20-I25
Other heart diseases  I26-I51
Cerebrovascular diseases I60-I69  32
Atherosclerosis I70
Remainder of diseases of the 
circulatory system 
I71-I99
Diseases of the 
respiratory 
system 
Influenza  J10-J11 
Pneumonia*  J12-J18
Other acute lower respiratory 
infections 
J20-J22
Chronic lower respiratory 
diseases 
J40-J47
Remainder of diseases of the 
respiratory system 
J00-J06, J30-J39, J60-J98
Diseases of the 
digestive system 
Gastric and duodenal ulcer K25-K27 
Diseases of the liver  K70-K76
Remainder of diseases of the 
digestive system 
K00-K22, K28-K66, K80-K92
Diseases of the skin and 
subcutaneous tissue 
L00-L98
Diseases of the musculoskeletal 
system and connective tissue 
M00-M99
Diseases of the 
genitourinary 
system 
Glomerular and renal tubulo-
interstitial diseases  N00-N15 






Pregnancy with abortive 
outcome  O00-O07 
Other direct obstetric deaths O10-O92
Indirect obstetric deaths O98-O99
Remainder of pregnancy, 
childbirth and the puerperium 
O95-O97
Certain conditions originating in 
the perinatal period 
P00-P96
Congenital malformations, 
deformations and chromosomal 
abnormalities 
Q00-Q99






WTO WTO  status 
Year of WTO 
membership 
Year of TRIPS 
compliance Hamden  Year 
Ginarte-Park 
Year 
Afghanistan Lower  Least  developed  Observer         
Albania Lower    Member  2000  2000     
Algeria Lower  Middle    Observer        1985 
Andorra High    Observer         
Angola Lower  Least  developed  Member  1996  2016    * 
Antigua and Barbuda  Upper Middle Developing  Member  1995  2000     
Argentina Upper  Middle  Developing Member  1995 2000 1996 2000 
Armenia Lower    Member  2003  2003     
Aruba High             
Australia High    Member  1995  1995    1990 
Austria High    Member  1995  1995    1985 
Azerbaijan Lower    Observer         
Bahamas, The  High    Observer         
Bahrain Upper  Middle  Developing  Member  1995  2000    * 
Bangladesh Lower  Least  developed Member 1995  2016  *   
Barbados Upper  Middle  Developing  Member  1995  2000     
Belarus Lower  Middle    Observer         
Belgium High    Member  1995  1995    1985 
Belize Lower  Middle  Developing Member  1995 2000 2000   
Benin Lower  Least  developed Member 1996  2016    * 
Bermuda High             
Bhutan Lower  Least  developed  Observer         
Bolivia Lower  Middle  Developing  Member  1995  2000  2000  1995 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  Lower    Observer         
Botswana Lower  Middle  Developing  Member  1995  2000    2000 
Brazil Upper  Middle  Developing  Member  1995  2000  2001  2000 
Brunei Darussalam  High  Developing  Member  1995  2000     
Bulgaria Lower  Middle    Member  1996  1996    2000 
Burkina Faso  Lower  Least developed Member 1995  2016    * 
Burundi Lower  Least  developed Member 1995  2016    * 
Cambodia Lower  Least  developed Member 2004  2016     






WTO WTO  status 
Year of WTO 
membership 
Year of TRIPS 
compliance Hamden  Year 
Ginarte-Park 
Year 
Canada High    Member  1995  1995    1990 
Cape Verde  Lower Middle Least  developed  Member  2008  2016     
Cayman Islands  High             
Central African Republic  Lower  Least developed  Member  1995  2016    * 
Chad Lower  Least  developed  Member  1996  2016    * 
Chile Upper  Middle  Developing  Member  1995  2000  2005  2000 
China Lower  Developing  Member  2001  2001    2005 
Colombia Lower  Middle  Developing  Member  1995  2000  2000  1995 
Comoros Lower  Least  developed  Observer         
Congo, Dem. Rep.  Lower  Least developed  Member  1997  2016    * 
Congo, Rep.  Lower  Developing  Member  1997  2000    * 
Costa Rica  Lower Middle  Developing  Member  1995  2000  2000  * 
Côte d'Ivoire  Lower  Developing  Member  1995  2000  2000  * 
Croatia Upper  Middle    Member  2000  2000     
Cuba Lower  Middle  Developing  Member  1995  2000     
Cyprus High  Developing  Member  1995  2000    * 
Czech Republic  Upper Middle    Member  1995  1995    * 
Denmark High    Member  1995  1995    1985 
Djibouti Lower  Middle  Least developed  Member  1995  2016     
Dominica Lower  Middle  Developing  Member  1995  2000  *   
Dominican Republic  Lower Middle Developing  Member  1995  2000    * 
Ecuador Lower  Middle    Member  1996  2000    1995 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  Lower Middle Developing  Member  1995  2000  2006  * 
El Salvador  Lower Middle  Developing Member  1995 2000    1995 
Equatorial Guinea  Lower  Least developed  Observer         
Eritrea Lower  Least  developed           
Estonia Lower  Middle  Developing Member  1999 2000     
Ethiopia Lower  Least  developed Observer        * 
Fiji Lower  Middle  Developing  Member  1996  2000    * 
Finland High    Member  1995  1995    1995 
France High    Member  1995  1995    1985 
Gabon Upper  Middle  Developing  Member  1995  2000  *  * 






WTO WTO  status 
Year of WTO 
membership 
Year of TRIPS 
compliance Hamden  Year 
Ginarte-Park 
Year 
Georgia Lower    Member  2000  2000     
Germany High    Member  1995  1995    1985 
Ghana Lower  Developing  Member  1995  2000  2003  1995 
Greece Upper  Middle    Member  1995  1995    1990 
Grenada Lower  Middle  Developing  Member  1996  2000    * 
Guatemala Lower  Middle  Developing Member  1995 2000 2000 2005 
Guinea Lower  Least  developed Member 1995  2016     
Guinea-Bissau Lower  Least  developed Member 1995  2016     
Guyana Lower  Developing  Member  1995  2000  *  * 
Haiti Lower  Least  developed Member 1996  2016  1999  * 
Honduras Lower  Developing Member  1995 2000    2000 
Hungary Upper  Middle    Member  1995  1995    1995 
Iceland High    Member  1995  1995    * 
India Lower  Developing  Member  1995  2000  2005  2005 
Indonesia Lower  Middle  Developing Member  1995 2000 1997 2000 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  Lower Middle    Observer         
Iraq Lower  Middle    Observer         
Ireland High    Member  1995  1995    1995 
Israel High  Developing  Member  1995  2000    1985 
Italy High    Member  1995  1995    1985 
Jamaica Lower  Middle  Developing Member  1995 2000  *  * 
Japan High    Member  1995  1995    1985 
Jordan Lower  Middle    Member  2000  2000    2000 
Kazakhstan Lower  Middle    Observer         
Kenya Lower  Developing  Member  1995  2000  2001  2005 
Kiribati Lower  Middle  Least  developed           
Korea, Dem. Rep.  Lower Middle             
Korea, Rep.  High  Developing  Member  1995  2000  1998  1985 
Kuwait High  Developing  Member  1995  2000     
Kyrgyz Republic  Lower    Member  1998  1998     
Lao PDR  Lower  Least developed  Observer         
Latvia Lower  Middle    Member  1999  1999     






WTO WTO  status 
Year of WTO 
membership 
Year of TRIPS 
compliance Hamden  Year 
Ginarte-Park 
Year 
Lesotho Lower  Middle  Least  developed Member 1995  2016     
Liberia Lower  Least  developed          * 
Libya Upper  Middle    Observer         
Lithuania Lower  Middle    Member  2001  2001    1995 
Luxembourg High    Member  1995  1995    1995 
Macao, China  High  Developing  Member  1995  2000     
Macedonia, FYR  Lower Middle   Member  2003  2003    
Madagascar Lower  Least  developed Member 1995  2016  *  * 
Malawi Lower  Least  developed Member 1995  2016  *  * 
Malaysia Upper  Middle  Developing  Member  1995  2000  2000  1985 
Maldives Lower  Middle  Least developed  Member  1995  2016     
Mali Lower  Least  developed Member 1995  2016    * 
Malta Upper  Middle  Developing  Member  1995  2000    2000 
Marshall Islands  Lower Middle             
Mauritania Lower  Least  developed Member 1995  2016    * 
Mauritius Upper  Middle  Developing  Member  1995  2000  2002  * 
Mexico Upper  Middle  Developing  Member  1995  2000  1995  2000 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.  Lower Middle             
Moldova Lower  Middle    Member  2001  2001     
Monaco High             
Mongolia Lower    Member  1997  1997     
Morocco Lower  Middle  Developing Member  1995 2000 2000  * 
Mozambique Lower  Least  developed Member 1995  2016     
Myanmar Lower  Least  developed Member 1995  2016     
Namibia Lower  Middle  Developing  Member  1995  2000  *   
Nepal Lower  Least  developed Member 2004  2016     
Netherlands High    Member  1995  1995    1985 
New Zealand  High    Member  1995  1995    1985 
Nicaragua Lower  Developing  Member  1995  2000  2000  * 
Niger Lower  Least  developed  Member  1996  2016    * 
Nigeria Lower  Developing  Member  1995  2000  *  * 
Norway High    Member  1995  1995    * 






WTO WTO  status 
Year of WTO 
membership 
Year of TRIPS 
compliance Hamden  Year 
Ginarte-Park 
Year 
Pakistan Lower  Developing  Member  1995  2000  2005  * 
Palau Upper  Middle             
Panama Lower  Middle    Member  1997  1997    2000 
Papua New Guinea  Lower Middle Developing  Member  1996  2000    * 
Paraguay Lower  Middle  Developing  Member  1995  2000  2005  2005 
Peru Lower  Middle  Developing Member  1995 2000 1995 1995 
Philippines Lower  Middle  Developing Member  1995 2000 1997 2000 
Poland Lower  Middle  Developing  Member  1995  2000  2000  2000 
Portugal High    Member  1995  1995    * 
Qatar High  Developing  Member  1996  2000     
Romania Lower  Middle  Developing  Member  1995  2000  1995  1995 
Russian Federation  Lower Middle    Observer        1995 
Rwanda Lower  Least  developed  Member  1996  2016    * 
Samoa Lower  Middle  Least  developed  Observer         
San Marino  High             
São Tomé and Principe  Lower  Least developed  Observer         
Saudi Arabia  Upper Middle    Member  2005  2005    * 
Senegal Lower  Least  developed Member 1995  2016  2000  * 
Serbia and Montenegro 
(former) Lower  Middle    Observer         
Seychelles Upper  Middle    Observer         
Sierra Leone  Lower  Least developed Member 1995  2016    * 
Singapore High  Developing  Member  1995  2000  1995  1990 
Slovak Republic  Lower Middle    Member  1995  1995  1995  1995 
Slovenia Upper  Middle    Member  1995  1995     
Solomon Islands  Lower Middle  Least developed  Member  1996  2016     
Somalia Lower  Least  developed          * 
South Africa  Upper Middle    Member  1995  1995  1997  1985 
Spain High    Member  1995  1995    1995 
Sri Lanka  Lower  Developing  Member  1995  2000  2003  * 
St. Kitts and Nevis  Upper Middle  Developing  Member  1996  2000     
St. Lucia  Upper Middle  Developing  Member  1995  2000  *   






WTO WTO  status 
Year of WTO 
membership 
Year of TRIPS 
compliance Hamden  Year 
Ginarte-Park 
Year 
Sudan Lower  Least  developed  Observer        * 
Suriname Lower  Middle  Developing  Member  1995  2000  *   
Swaziland Lower  Middle  Developing  Member  1995  2000  *   
Sweden High    Member  1995  1995    1985 
Switzerland High    Member  1995  1995    1985 
Syrian Arab Republic  Lower Middle            * 
Tajikistan Lower    Observer         
Tanzania Lower  Least  developed Member 1995  2016  *  * 
Thailand Lower  Middle  Developing Member  1995 2000 1999 1995 
Togo Lower  Least  developed  Member  1995  2016    * 
Tonga Lower  Middle    Member  2007  2007     
Trinidad and Tobago  Upper Middle  Developing  Member  1995  2000    2000 
Tunisia Lower  Middle  Developing  Member  1995  2000     
Turkey Lower  Middle  Developing  Member  1995  2000  1999  1995 
Turkmenistan Lower  Middle             
Uganda Lower  Least  developed Member 1995  2016  *  * 
Ukraine Lower  Middle    Observer        1995 
United Arab Emirates  High  Developing Member  1996 2000     
United Kingdom  High    Member  1995  1995    1985 
United States  High    Member  1995  1995    1985 
Uruguay Upper  Middle  Developing  Member  1995  2000  2001  2000 
Uzbekistan Lower  Middle    Observer         
Vanuatu Lower  Middle  Least  developed Member 2007  2016     
Venezuela, RB  Lower Middle  Developing Member  1995 2000 1995 1995 
Vietnam Lower    Observer    2008    1995 
Virgin Islands (U.S.)  High             
Yemen, Rep.  Lower  Least developed Observer         
Zambia Lower  Least  developed  Member  1995  2016  *  * 
Zimbabwe Lower  Developing  Member  1995  2000      * 
   39
 